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Abstract
This paper explores the idea that fear of floating can be justified
as an optimal discretionary monetary policy in a dollarized emerging
economy. Specifically, I consider a small open economy in which inter-
mediate goods importers borrow in foreign currency and face a credit
constraint. In this economy, exchange rate depreciation not only wors-
ens importers’ net-worth but also increases the financing amount in
domestic currency, therefore exaggerating their borrowing finance pre-
mium. Besides, because of high exchange rate pass-through into im-
port prices, fluctuations in the exchange rate also have strong impacts
on domestic prices and production. These effects, together, magnify
the macroeconomic consequences of the floating exchange rate policy
in response to external shocks. The paper shows that the floating ex-
change rate regime is dominated by the fixed exchange rate regime in
the role of cushioning shocks and in welfare terms.
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1 Introduction
There are two distinguishing features in exchange rates and financial sys-
tems in emerging economies. They are: (i) the so-called fear of floating, a
phenomenon where authorities are reluctant to let their nominal exchange
rates fluctuate and (ii) liability dollarization, the increasing uses of the U.S
dollar in debt denomination. This paper addresses the question of whether
fear of floating can be justified an optimal discretionary monetary policy in
a dollarized emerging economy.
Fear of floating seems to be a puzzling phenomenon since most exchange
rate crises in emerging economies occurred in pegged exchange rate envi-
ronments and nominal exchange rate rigidities have been perceived as one of
main reasons. However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show that despite having
experienced severe exchange rate crises, authorities in emerging economies
have kept resisting exchange rate fluctuations and consequently there has not
much variation in nominal exchange rates in these economies. In particular,
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) present evidence that interest rate and reserve
variabilities are significantly higher in emerging market economies than in
their developed counterparts. The probability that the monthly variation
of nominal exchange rates is in a narrow band of plus and minus 2.5% is
more than 79% for all developing countries. 1 Given the fact that emerging
economies often experience much more volatile shocks than their developed
counterpart, relatively small variation in nominal exchange rates in emerging
economies is remarkable.
On the other hand, liability dollarization belongs to another broad fea-
ture that has recently obtained popularity in emerging/developing economies:
dollarization. In these countries, it has become increasingly popular that
1In details, the probabilities are 79%, 87%, and 92% for those who claim to have freely
floating exchange rate regime, managed floating, and limited floating, respectively. The
probabilities for developed countries like U.S and Japan is 59% and 61%.
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governments borrow in the U.S dollar, individuals can hold U.S dollar de-
nominated bank accounts, firms and households can borrow in the U.S dollar
both domestically and internationally. In particular, to quantitatively doc-
ument dollarization, Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) (RRS, hence-
forth) build a composite index of dollarization for a wide range of developing
countries so are able to show that that the frequency distribution of the com-
posite dollarization index has shifted markedly to the right between 1980-85
and 1996-2001. The shift indicates that the degree of dollarization in devel-
oping countries has risen significantly during these periods.2 By exploring
the data further, RRS are able to show that by late 90s, more than half of 143
countries in their samples have at least 10% of broad money or of domestic
public debt denominated or linked to foreign currency and one third of these
143 countries have more than 10% of external debts borrowed from private
sector. They also find evidence suggesting that higher level of dollarization
tends to increase the exchange rate pass-through, thereby reinforcing the fear
of floating in highly dollarized economies.
This paper attempts to shed light on the relationship between the two
aforementioned notable features, particularly the question of whether fear
of floating can be justified as an optimal discretionary monetary policy in
dollarized emerging economy in response to external shocks. To this end, I
consider a small open economy in which intermediate goods importers bor-
row in foreign currencies and face credit constraints. Foreign intermediate
goods are required for final goods production. In this economy, interest rates
2Concretely, RRS define a (partially) dollarized economy as one where households and
firms hold a fraction of their portfolio (inclusive of money balances) in foreign currency
assets and/or where the private and public sector have debts denominated in foreign
currency. The composite index is defined as the (normalized) sum of bank deposits in
foreign currency as a share of broad money, total external debt as a share of GNP, and
domestic government debt denominated in (or linked to) a foreign currency as a share of
total domestic government debt.
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that domestic borrowers pay to foreign lenders depend on the borrowers’
net-worth, which characterizes the financial acceleration, i.e., the higher the
leverage is the higher the interest rates borrowers have to pay.
It should be noted that this paper is not the first to address the rela-
tionship between dollarization and exchange rate policies. Cespedes et al.
(2002) and Devereux et al (2006) (henceforth DLX) have followed Bernanke
et al (1999) (henceforth BGG) to take into account credit constraints in
investment financing for liability-dollarized emerging economies. In these
models, exchange rate fluctuations affect firms’ real net worth positions and
investments through balance-sheet constraints, thereby having impacts on
the macroeconomy. Despite different settings, the two papers reach quite
similar conclusions: balance-sheet constraints in the presence of liability dol-
larization is an important propagation channel, it can magnify the effects
of external shocks, leading both real and financial variables’ volatility to be
greater than in an economy without these constraints. However, even under
financial imperfections and balance sheet constraints, the inflation targeting
or the flexible exchange rate regime still dominates the fixed exchange rate
regime in both the role of cushioning external shocks and in welfare terms.
Nonetheless, there is a common feature in Crespedes and DLX that limits
the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on other macroeconomic variables.
In these models, exchange rate fluctuations only affect the net worth of firms
and via this channel determine the finance premium of foreign currency bor-
rowing. Emerging economies, most of which are relatively less industrialized,
have to rely heavily on imported intermediate goods for domestic production.
Christiano et al (2006), for example, shows that in developing countries,
more than 80% of the import is intermediate goods for domestic production.
The heavy reliance on foreign intermediate goods implies a high exchange
rate pass-through and high external exposure. Moreover, because of lim-
ited cross-border enforcements particularlly for emerging countries, import
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firms are subject to borrowing constraints. As a result, when import firms
borrow in foreign currencies to finance intermediate goods, exchange rate
fluctuations affects not only the borrowers’ net worth but also the financing
amount. This very “double-effect” from exchange rate fluctuations leads to
more profound impacts on the leverage of import firms, causing much more
fluctuations in finance premium than those in Crespedes and DLX ’models.
The borrowing constraint imposed on import firms is the main departure
from to DLX’s paper.
Under aforementioned different specifications, this paper follows DLX to
re-examine the macroeconomic consequences and compare welfare of alterna-
tive monetary policies: the inflation targeting regime and the fixed exchange
rate regime 3 in response to external shocks. This paper finds that fear of
floating can be justified in highly dollarized economies. The volatilities of
output, consumptions, and imported goods are higher under the inflation
targeting rule than under the fixed exchange rate rule. The welfare of the
fixed exchange rate regime also dominates that for the inflation targeting
regime in a wide range of parameter specifications.
There are several other papers addressing fear of floating. Lahiri and
Vegh (2001) incorporate three key frictions into their model: an output cost
of nominal exchange rate fluctuations, an output cost of higher interest rates
to defend the currency, and a fixed cost of intervention. The model then pre-
dicts a non-monotonic relationship between the nominal exchange rate and
the size of the shock. For large shocks, which are identified for developing
countries, the output costs resulting from exchange rate fluctuations become
too large relative to the cost of intervening. Therefore, monetary authorities
find it optimal to stabilize the exchange rate. My research differs with this
3I follow the setting of endogenous monetary policy as in DLX, and use the perturbation
method from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe’s paper to solve the model to the second order
approximation in order to calculate the welfare.
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paper in several aspects. First, I incorporate stochastic environment and
financial constraints and its endogenous propagation mechanism via the fi-
nancial acceleration to the macroeconomy while Lahiri and Vegh (2001) do
not. Second, I address the external shocks, particularly the terms of trade
shock while the paper addresses monetary shocks.
My paper shares a key aspect with the paper by Devereux and Poon
(2004): Intermediate good importers in developing countries face endoge-
nous borrowing constraints so exchange rate adjustments might become de-
stabilizing. The difference is that Devereux and Poon (2004) assume a col-
lateral borrowing constraint like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In their model,
the constraint is not always binding ; it binds only when shocks are negative
and large so the model might be more suitable to address monetary policies
in crises. By contrast, I follow the BGG framework in which exchange rate
fluctuations always have impacts on the borrowers’ leverage, hence on the
financial premium, regardless of the scale and direction of shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section
3 discusses calibration and the solution of the model. Section 4 develops
the main results including impulse responses, volatilities of macroeconomic
variables, and welfare evaluation under alternative monetary policies. Some
conclusions follow.
2 The Model
2.1 Model Outline
This is one sector model of a small open economy where final goods are do-
mestically produced using labor and imported intermediate goods. Domestic
5
agents consume only domestically produced final goods,4 they are, however,
endowed with a fixed amount of tradable goods, which can be exported to
the rest of the world with exogenous prices.
The model has following characteristics: (i) rigidities in prices,5 (ii) credit
constraints in foreign currency borrowing to highlight balance-sheet effects of
liability dollarization, (iii) imperfect substitutability between domestic value-
added goods and imported intermediate goods to capture the reliance of
domestic production on foreign intermediate goods.
There are four sets of domestic agents in the model: households, firms,
importers, and the monetary authority, vs. “the rest of world” where foreign-
currency prices of imported intermediate goods are set and lending rates of
foreign fund are determined. The rest of the world also demands domestically
endowed tradable goods, which domestic agents do not consume. Domestic
households have access to international financial markets through two kinds
of non-state-contingent bonds. Financing contracts are set up between for-
eign bankers and domestic importer firms who need to borrow to finance
imported intermediate goods. Final goods firms hire labor from households,
re-buy intermediate goods from importers, and sell goods to both domestic
households and importers for consumption. Finally, the monetary authority
sets domestic nominal interest rates as a monetary policy instrument.
4This assumption is justified by empirical evidence that suggests in the majority of
developing countries less than 17% of imported goods is for consumptions and other left
are intermediate goods for domestic production.
5To allow effective monetary policy under New-Keynesian framework
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2.2 Households
There is a continuum of households of measure one. The representative
household maximizes its expected life-time utility which is given as follows:
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(C1−σt
1− σ − η
L1+ψt
1 + ψ
)
(2.1)
where Ct is composite consumption, and Lt is labor supply. Composite con-
sumption is a function of only domestically produced differentiated goods
Ct(i), Ct = (
∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
ρ−1
ρ di)
ρ
ρ−1 , with ρ > 1. The implied consumer price
index CPI is then Pt = (
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−ρdi)
1
1−ρ , where Pt(i) is the price of differ-
entiated good i.
Households have access to financial markets with non state-contingent
bonds in the form of both domestic and foreign currency denomination.
Trade in foreign currency bonds is, however, subject to small portfolio ad-
justment costs, ψD
2
(Dt+1− D¯)2, 6 where D¯ is an exogenous steady state level
of net foreign debt and Dt is the amount of foreign debts. The household
can borrow directly in terms of foreign currency at a given interest rate i∗t ,
or in domestic currency assets at an interest rate it.
Each period, the representative household’s revenue comes from final
goods firms’ profits Πt, the supply of labor with wages Wt, incomes from ex-
porting endowment goods StP
∗
XtX¯, total debts he can borrow StDt+1+Bt+1,
less debt repayment from last period (1+ i∗t )StDt+(1+ it)Bt, as well as port-
folio adjustment costs. Therefore, his budget constraint can be expressed as:
PtCt =WtLt + Πt + StDt+1 + Bt+1 + StP
∗
XtX¯ (2.2)
− (1 + i∗t )StDt − (1 + it)Bt − Pt
ψD
2
(Dt+1 − D¯)2
6As shown in Schitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), portfolio adjustment costs induce sta-
tionarity in economy’s net foreign assets.
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Here St is the nominal exchange rate, P
∗
Xt is the price of export goods in
foreign currency, Dt is the outstanding amount of foreign currency debt and
Bt is the stock of domestic currency debt, X¯ is the endowment amount of
export goods.
The household chooses each differentiated goods to minimize expenditure
conditional on total composite consumption. Demand for each differentiated
goods then can be derived as follows:
Ct(i) =
(Pt(i)
Pt
)−ρ
Ct (2.3)
The household’s first order conditions can be expressed as:
1
1 + i∗t+1
[
1− ψDPt
St
(Dt+1 − D¯)
]
= βEt
{
Cσt Pt
Cσt+1Pt+1
St+1
St
}
(2.4)
1
1 + it+1
= βEt
(
Cσt Pt
Cσt+1Pt+1
)
(2.5)
Wt = ηL
ψ
t PtC
σ
t (2.6)
Equations 2.4 and 2.5 represent the Euler equations for the purchase
of foreign and domestic currency bonds. Equation 2.6 is the labor supply
equation.
2.3 Production Firms
Differentiated final goods Y (i) is a CES function of domestically produced
value added V (i) and imported intermediate goods M(i).
Yt(i) =
[
a
1
 Vt(i)
−1
 + (1− a) 1 Mt(i) −1
] 
−1 (2.7)
Value added Vt is in turn produced using only labor input as follows:
Vt(i) = AvtLt(i) (2.8)
where Avt is the productivity shock.
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Cost minimizing behavior of final goods firm i implies that:
Vt(i) = a
( Wt
AvtMCt(i)
)−
Y (i) (2.9)
Mt(i) = (1− a)
( Zt
MCt(i)
)−
Y (i) (2.10)
where Wt, Zt,MCt is the nominal wage, the domestic price of imported in-
termediate goods, and the marginal cost, respectively.
2.4 Price Setting
Firms in the final sector set their prices as monopolistic competitors. I
assume that each firm bears a small direct cost of price adjustment as in
Rotemberg (1982), therefore, firms will only adjust prices gradually in re-
sponse to demand or the marginal cost shocks. Firms are owned by domestic
households, hence firms will maximize their expected profit stream using
households’ discount factor. The discount factor is defined as follows:
Γt+1 = β
PtC
σ
t
Pt+1Cσt+1
. (2.11)
Using this, we can define the objective function of the final goods firm i
as follows:
E0
∞∑
t=0
Γt
[
Pt(i)Yt(i)−MCtYt(i)− ψP
2
(
Pt(i)− Pt−1(i)
Pt(i)
)2
]
(2.12)
where Γ0 = 1, and Yt(i) = (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ρYt represents total demand for firm i’s
product, and the third expression inside the parentheses are the costs of price
changes.
Firm i chooses its price to maximize (2.12). Because all final goods firms
are alike, after imposing symmetry, the optimal price setting equation can
be expressed as:
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Pt =
ρ
ρ− 1MCt −
ψP
ρ− 1
Pt
Yt
Pt
Pt−1
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)
+
ψP
ρ− 1Et
[
Γt+1
Pt+1
Yt
Pt+1
Pt
(
Pt+1
Pt
− 1
)]
(2.13)
Notice that when the parameter ψP is zero, the final good price is just
a markup over the marginal cost. Otherwise, the price follows a dynamic
adjustment process.
2.5 Importers
In this section, I follows closely BGG and DLX to describe credit constraints
of import firms (henceforth, importers).7 As mentioned by BGG and others,
financial market imperfections make external borrowing more costly than fi-
nancing project out of internal resources and the borrowing premium depends
on borrower’s network relative to total required borrowing.
In particular, in order to finance intermediate goods imports, importers
need to borrow in foreign currency from foreign lenders. Each importer
faces an idiosyncratic shock ω ∈ (0,∞), drawn from a distribution F (ω),
with probability density function (pdf) f(ω), and expected value E(ω) = 1.
Shock ω is observed by the importer, but can only be observed by the lender
through monitoring that incurs extra costs. The borrowing arrangement
between lenders and importers is then constrained by the presence of private
information. The optimal contract is a debt contract specified by a given
amount of lending and a state-dependent threshold level of shock ω¯. If the
importer reports shock exceeding the threshold, then a fixed payment ω¯
times the return on the import project is made to the lender, and there is
no monitoring. But if reported shock is lower than the threshold, then the
7See the Appendix for further details.
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lender pays monitoring costs μ times the value of the project to monitor and
receives the full residual amount of the import project.
An importer j, at the end of period t, plans to import M jt+1 units of
intermediate goods must pay nominal price StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1 to foreigners. Here,
P ∗Mt is the price of imported intermediate goods, which is given to him at
time t. If the importer begins with nominal net worth in domestic currency
given by NWt+1, then he needs to borrow in foreign currency an amount
given by
DjMt+1 =
1
St
(StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1 −NW jt+1) (2.14)
The total expected return on the import project is Et(RMt+1StP
∗
MtMt+1),
where RMt+1 is the return rate from importing and will be defined below.
The optimal contract specifies a cut-off value of the importer’s shock,
ω¯t+1, and an amount of imported intermediate goods, Mt+1. Under this
contract structure, the importer receives an expected share A(ω¯t+1) of the
total return on the import project and the lender receives a share B(ω¯t+1).
In sum, A(ω¯t+1) + B(ω¯t+1) + φt+1 = 1, where φt+1 represents the expected
cost of monitoring.8
As shown in the Appendix, the first order conditions for the optimal
contract can be expressed by the following two equations:
Et
{
RMt+1
[
B(ω¯t+1)
A′(ω¯t+1)
B′(ω¯t+1) −A(ω¯t+1)
]}
Et
[
A′(ω¯t+1)
B′(ω¯t+1)
St+1
St
] = 1 + i∗t+1 (2.15)
RMt+1St
St+1
B(ω¯t+1) = (1 + i
∗
t+1)(1−
NWt+1
StP
∗
MtMt+1
) (2.16)
Equation (2.15) represents the relationship between the expected return
from the import project (LHS) and the opportunity cost of funds for lender
8A(ω¯), B(ω¯), and φN may be written as follows: A(ω¯) =
∫∞
ω¯
ωf(ω)dω− ω¯ ∫∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω,
B(ω¯) = ω¯
∫∞
ω¯ f(ω)dω + (1 − μ)
∫ ω¯
0 ωf(ω)dω, φt = μ
∫ ω¯
0 ωf(ω)dω. It is straightforward to
show that A′(ω¯) ≤ 0, and B′(ω¯) ≥ 0.
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(RHS). Without private information(hence, no monitoring costs), the ex-
pected return would equal the opportunity cost of funds for the lender. How-
ever, the presence of moral hazard in the lending environment imposes an
external finance premium, so that the return Et(RMt+1) will be greater than
the opportunity cost (1+i∗t+1)Et
St+1
St
and the extent of this premium depends
on the value of ω¯. The key characteristic of the BGG financial acceleration
framework is that the borrowing premium is related to the borrowing amount.
This relationship is reflected through the participation constraint equation
for the lender (2.16). The smaller is the importers net worth NWt+1 relative
to total required amount StP
∗
MtMt+1, the more the importer must borrow,
hence the higher the share B(ω¯t+1) for the lender.
Equations (2.15) and (2.16) may then be used to show that the external
finance premium E(RMt+1)
(1+i∗t+1)E
St+1
St
is increasing in the leverage ratio
StP ∗MtMt+1
NWt+1
.9
A fall in the importer’s net worth or an increase in the financing amount
or both will directly reduce the amount of imported intermediate goods by
raising the external finance premium. In other words, financial acceleration
implies that the more the importer borrows or the less net-worth he has
or both then importer has to bear a higher cost of borrowing. The novel
feature of this paper compared to the literature, is that a nominal exchange
rate depreciation leads to both a fall in importers’ net-worth and a rise in
the financing amount, thereby accelerating the finance premium more than
those analyzed in literature.
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and BGG, I design the importers
so that they are always constrained by the need to borrow so that financial
acceleration always takes place. This can be obtained by assuming that a
fraction of the existing stock of importers randomly die each period so that
importers don’t build up wealth to the extent that the borrowing constraint
is non-binding and at the same time a fraction of importers arrives to replace
9See BGG, Appendix
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these exiting ones.
At the beginning of each period, a non-defaulting importer j receives the
return on the import project RMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1Mt(j)(ωt(j) − ω¯t). Importers,
then, die at any time period with probability (1− ν) and consume (all their
net-worth) only in the period in which they die. Therefore, at any given
period, a fraction (1 − ν) of the return on the import project is consumed
away. Since shocks on importers are i.i.d., the functional forms here can be
aggregated so that the average return on import is RMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1MtA(ω¯t).
The consumption for the importer, therefore, can be expressed as:
PCmt = (1− ν)RMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1MtA(ω¯t) (2.17)
where Cmt is the consumption level of importers when they die. And im-
porters’ aggregate net worth is equal to:
NWt+1 = νRMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1MtA(ω¯t) (2.18)
Using the definition of A(ω¯) and the lender’s participation constraint
equation, we re-write importer’s net-worth as:
NWt+1 =ν(1− φt)RMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1Mt (2.19)
− ν(1 + i∗t )
St
St−1
(St−1P ∗Mt−1Mt −NWt)
Notice that an depreciation of current exchange rate reduces the im-
porter’s net worth by raising the value of existing foreign currency liabilities.
To conclude this section, we define the return on the import project.
Importers sell their imported intermediate goods directly to final goods firms.
Therefore, the gross nominal return rate from importing is,
RMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1 = Zt (2.20)
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2.6 Monetary Policy Rules
The monetary authority uses domestic interest rate as the monetary instru-
ment. The general form of the interest rate rule used can be expressed as
1 + it+1 =
(
Pt
Pt−1
1
π¯
)μπ (St
S¯
)μS
(1 + i¯) (2.21)
The parameter μπ allows the monetary authority to control the CPI infla-
tion rate around the desired level of π¯ whereas μS controls the degree to which
interest rates attempt to control fluctuations in the exchange rate around a
target level of S¯. I will compare the properties of alternative exchange rate
regimes under two main different assumptions regarding the values of these
policy coefficients.
2.7 Equilibrium
Every period, each final goods market must clear. After imposing the sym-
metry between goods we obtain:
Yt = Ct + C
M
t +
ψD
2
(Dt+1 − D¯)2 + ψP
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1)2 + ZtMt
Pt
φt (2.22)
Equation (2.22) means demand for final goods comes from households’
consumption, importers’ consumption, portfolio adjustment costs, costs of
price adjustment, and costs of monitoring loans.
The aggregate balance of payments condition for this small open economy
can be derived by adding the budget constraint of the household and the
importer and can be expressed as follows:
StP
∗
MtMt+1 + St(1 + it
∗)[Dt + DMt] = StP ∗XtX¯ + St[Dt+1 + DMt+1] (2.23)
Equation 1.16 indicates that total expenditures, which comprise of amount
of importing and debt payments, must equal total receipts, which are the
amount of exporting, plus new net foreign borrowing.
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3 Calibration and Solution
The benchmark parameter choices for the model are described in Table 1.
Following literature, this paper sets the inter-temporal elasticity of substi-
tution in consumption to 0.5 or σ = 2. ψ is set to 1, implying the unity
elasticity of labor supply, which is common in empirical literature.10
The elasticity of substitution between varieties of final goods determines
the average price-cost mark-up, hence, this paper follows standard estimates
from the literature in setting a 10 percent mark-up, so that ρ = 11.
One important thing in this paper is that I consider relatively low sub-
stitutability between domestic value-added intermediate goods and the im-
ported intermediate goods in the production of final goods. Since developing
countries often rely on imported intermediate goods, which are essential to
domestic production but they have limited resources to produce for them-
selves, I follow Christiano et al (2007) and others to choose the elasticity of
substitution between imported intermediate goods and value added interme-
diate goods less than unity,  = 0.9. 11
I also assume that this small open economy starts out in a steady state
with zero consumption growth, therefore, the world interest rate must equal
the rate of time preference. I set the world interest rate equal to 6 percent
annually, an approximate number used in the macro-RBC literature, so that
at the quarterly level, this implies a value of 0.985 for the discount factor. I
set D¯ so that steady state total debt 12 is 40 percent of GDP, approximately
10For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) and set elasticity of labor
supply to other values different from unity does not change the paper’s conclusions but
the implied volatility of key macroeconomic variables.
11In another paper by Christiano et al (2004), when labor appears in production of
value-added, they even allow no substitutability between value-added good and imported
intermediate goods but this model does not include capital so I set a higher value of 
12Which include the debt of importer
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that for East Asian economies in the late 1990’s. The amount of tradable
endowment X¯ is chosen such that in steady state export is equal to 40% of
GDP, which is also in the range of literature.
I set parameter a in the domestic production function so that the share of
imported intermediate goods in production is 40 percent, implying a is equal
to 0.6. This is consistent with the estimates given for intermediate imports
as a fraction of GDP in Christiano et. al (2006) for Thailand.
With respect to portfolio adjustment costs, I follow the estimate of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2003) to set ψD = .0007.
To calibrate the degree of nominal rigidity in the model, I set the param-
eter governing the cost of price adjustment, ψP so that, if the model were
interpreted as being governed by the dynamics of the standard Calvo price,
adjustment process, all prices would adjust on average after 4 quarters. To
match this degree of price adjustment requires a value of ψP = 120.
I choose a steady state risk spread of 350 basis points, which is higher
than DLX and BGG but might be consistent with developing countries. I
follow BGG to set leverage level to 2 and bankruptcy cost parameter μ equal
to 0.12. Given the other parameters chosen, the implied savings rate of
entrepreneurs is equal to 0.93.
In this paper, I consider two types of shock as in DLX: a) shocks to the
world interest rate, b) shocks to (inverse) terms of trade. In the model, a) is
represented by shocks to i∗t , b) is represented by shocks to
P ∗Mt
P ∗Xt
.
The general form of the interest rule (2.21) allows for a variety of different
types of monetary policy stances. This paper focuses analysis on two types of
rules. The first rule is a CPI targeting rule (CPI rule), whereby the monetary
authority targets the stability of domestic consumer price index so that he
sets μπ → ∞. Secondly, I analyze a simple fixed exchange rate μS → ∞,
whereby the monetary authorities adjust interest rates so as to keep the
nominal exchange rate from fluctuating.
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The model is, then, solved numerically using a second order approxi-
mation to the dynamic stochastic system, where the approximation is done
around the non-stochastic steady state by perturbation method. Since I later
proceed to compare the two alternative monetary rules in terms of welfare,13
it is necessary to use a second order approximation. For example, as demon-
strated by Kim and Kim (2002), in a simple two-agent economy, a welfare
comparison based on an evaluation of the utility function using a linear/first
order approximation to the policy function may yield the spurious result such
that welfare is higher under autarky than under full risk sharing, which is
apparently wrong. Woodford (2003) also shows that a second order accurate
representation of expected utility can be obtained only through a second or-
der representation of the underlying dynamic system, except in special cases.
4 Analysis
I now examine impacts of external shocks under the two alternative monetary
rules. I assume that all shocks can be described as AR(1) processes and
adopt the VAR results of DLX for the US interest rate, a proxy for the world
interest rate, with persistence 0.46 and the standard deviation of 0.0122 and
(log) term of trade shocks with persistence 0.77 and standard deviation 0.013.
There is negligible correlation between innovations between the world interest
rate and terms of trade.
4.1 Impulse Responses
Figure 1 presents impulse responses in response to a negative terms of trade
shock, i.e., an increase in the imported intermediate goods price relative to
13Welfare in this economy is represented by the expected utility of households and
importers.
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Table 1: Model Calibration
Parameter Value Description
σ 2 Inverse of elasticity of substitution in consumption
β 0.985 Discount factor (quarterly real interest rate is 1−ββ )
 0.9 Elasticity of substitution between value added
goods and import goods in production
ρ 11 Elasticity of substitution between varieties
η 1.0 Coefficient on labor in utility
ψ 1.0 Inverse elasticity of labor supply
a 0.6 Share on value added goods in production
ψP 120 Price adjustment cost
ψD 0.0007 Bond adjustment cost
σω 0.5 Standard deviation of importers’ technology shocks
μ 0.12 Coefficient of monitoring cost for lenders
ν 0.93 Aggregate saving rate of importers
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the export goods price. A key difference between the CPI rule and the fixed
exchange rate rule is that the former attempts to stabilize final good prices
and allows the exchange rate to fluctuate whereas the latter attempts to fix
the exchange rate.
In particular, under the CPI targeting rule, the monetary authority ad-
justs the domestic interest rate (hence, the exchange rate) so that final goods
firms don’t have incentives to change the price level. In other words, the
monetary authority adjusts the monetary instrument so that the marginal
cost of final good production stays unchanged in response to shocks. On
impact of the terms of trade shock, since the cost of imported intermediate
goods is already determined from the previous period, the monetary author-
ity has to adjust the domestic interest rate so that labor costs (the wage rate)
remains unchanged. Consequently, labor supply, consumption, and output
remain unchanged on impact under the CPI rule. Nevertheless, the negative
terms of trade shock will raise the cost of imported goods from the next
period, therefore induce decreases in domestic production and consumption.
Since households tend to smooth consumption, the interest rate has to be
decreased significantly on impact so that households keep the same level of
consumption in the first period and then gradually reduce it afterward. As
a result, the exchange rate depreciates on impact of the negative shock. The
depreciation of the exchange rate under the CPI rule, combined with an in-
crease in the imported goods price, strongly hits on the import sector by not
only increasing the domestic price of imported good prices but also wors-
ening the importers’ net-worth hence raising the borrowing risk premium.
Consequently, from the second period after the shock, the exchange rate has
to appreciate significantly to offset both the initial depreciation and an in-
crease in imported goods prices. Therefore, the domestic interest rate has to
be increased accordingly from the second period, which then contributes to
significant drops in consumption, output, and imported goods.
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By contrast, under the fixed exchange rate regime, final good prices in-
crease in response to the negative terms of trade shock and households con-
sume less consumption goods and more leisure (the substitution effect). The
responses of other variables under the fixed exchange rate rule are straight-
forward. It is shown by the figure that consumption, output, and imported
intermediate goods are more volatile under the CPI rule while employment
is more fluctuating under the fixed exchange rate rule.
Figure 2 presents the impulse responses in response to a positive world
interest rate shock. 14 In response to the shock, the monetary authority raises
the domestic interest rate to fight against the depreciation of the exchange
rate under the fixed exchange rate regime. An increase in the dosmestic
interest rate leads to decreases in consumption, output, hence in imported
goods. By contrast, the exchange rate depreciates on impact under the CPI
rule, which makes imported intermediate goods more costly. The financial
acceleration applies so that the drop in the imported goods is as profound as
that in the fixed exchange rate regime. Nonetheless, the impacts of the world
interest rate on real variables are small and there are not clear differences
under the two alternative monetary rules.
Table 2 compares the implied standard deviations of key macroeconomic
variables under the two alternative monetary rules when the model is driven
by the two aforementioned shocks. It is shown that volatilities of output,
consumptions, and imported intermediate goods are higher under the CPI
targeting rule than that under the fixed exchange rate. However, labor in-
put under the fixed exchange rate rule is more volatile than that under the
CPI targeting rule. The reason goes as follows. Monetary policies under the
CPI rule aim to stabilize the marginal cost of final good production, which
consists of labor costs and imported intermediate good costs. Since the lat-
ter is determined from the previous period the monetary authority adjusts
14I scale up the IRs by 100 times.
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the domestic interest rate to stabilize the labor cost, which lead to a rela-
tively stable labor market under the CPI rule. However, as explained above,
exchange rate fluctuations under the CPI rule with the presence of a high
exchange rate pass-through and liability dollarization have strong impacts
on output, consumption, and intermediate goods. High volatility in these
key macroeconomic variables may explain the stylized-fact that emerging
economies are reluctant to let their exchange rates fluctuate or the so-called
“fear of floating”.
4.2 Welfare Evaluation
Finally, I evaluate welfare of the economy under each monetary policy regime.
The solution method produces a second order accurate measure of expected
utility. I follow DLX to modify the way taking into account the welfare of
importers. The welfare of households, as usual, can be measured as follows:
E0
∞∑
t
βtU(Ct, Nt) (4.24)
Since importers are risk neutral, gain utility only from final goods con-
sumption, and consume at any time period with probability 1 − ν, we can
express the utility of importers with unit measure in total as:
E0
∞∑
t
βtCmt (4.25)
given the assumption that the monetary authority discounts the utility of
future importers at the same rate that households discount future utility.
The last column of Table 2 shows the implied welfare results: The welfare
of economy under the fixed exchange rate regime is higher than that under
the CPI targeting rule. These results are consistent with above implied
volatility of key macroeconomic variables and therefore confirming the “fear
of floating” phenomenon.
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Figure 1: IRs: Terms of Trade Shock
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Figure 2: IRs: World Interest Rate Shock i∗:
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5 Conclusions
This paper considers a small open highly dollarized economy borrowing in
foreign currencies to import intermediate goods and facing borrowing con-
straints. The paper quantitatively shows that “fear of floating” can be justi-
fied as a discretionary optimal monetary policy because floating the exchange
rate leads to relatively more volatile domestic production, consumption, and
import, therefore lowering welfare in response to external world shocks.
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Technical Appendix of
“Liability Dollarization and Fear of Floating”
1 Equilibrium
1.1 Households
The representative household’s budget constraint is described as in the text.
The household optimality conditions for labor supply, domestic bond de-
mand, and foreign bond demand are as follows:
Wt = ηL
ψ
t PtC
σ
t (1.1)
1
1 + it+1
= βEt
(
Cσt Pt
Cσt+1Pt+1
)
(1.2)
1
1 + i∗t+1
[
1− ψDPt
St
(Dt+1 − D¯)
]
= βEt
(
Cσt Pt
Cσt+1Pt+1
St+1
St
)
(1.3)
1.2 Production Firms
After imposing the symmetry condition, the optimality of production firms
can be written as:
Yt =
[
a
1
 V
−1

t + (1− a)
1
 M
−1

t
] 
−1 (1.4)
Vt = AvtLt (1.5)
Vt = a
( Wt
AvtMCt
)−
Y (1.6)
Mt = (1− a)
( Zt
MCt
)−
Y (1.7)
The price setting condition:
1
Pt =
ρ
ρ− 1MCt −
ψP
ρ− 1
Pt
Yt
Pt
Pt−1
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)
+
ψP
ρ− 1Et
[
Γt+1
Pt+1
Yt
Pt+1
Pt
(
Pt+1
Pt
− 1
)]
(1.8)
1.3 The importer’s problem:
The details of the optimal contract are derived below. Here we outline the
specification of one importer’s behavior for the solution of the model. Each
period, the importer borrows in foreign currency an amount:
DMt+1 =
1
St
(StP
∗
MtMt+1 −NWt+1) (1.9)
The first order conditions for the optimal contract are:
Et
{
RMt+1
[
B(ω¯t+1)
A′(ω¯t+1)
B′(ω¯t+1) −A(ω¯t+1)
]}
Et
[
A′(ω¯t+1)
B′(ω¯t+1)
St+1
St
] = 1 + i∗t+1 (1.10)
RMt+1St
St+1
B(ω¯t+1) = (1 + i
∗
t+1)(1−
NWt+1
StP ∗MtMt+1
) (1.11)
A(·) is defined as the expected fraction of the return on capital accruing
to the entrepreneur as part of the optimal contract. We may write is as:
A(ω¯) =
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωf(ω)dω− ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω
As shown later on this Appendix:
A(ω¯) =
1
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯)− σ2ω
2√
2σω
)
− ω¯
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯) + σ
2
ω
2√
2σω
)
where erfc(z) = 2√
π
∫∞
z
e−t
2
dt is the “complementary error function”.
Likewise the share of returns to the lender, net of monitoring costs, is
B(·) = ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω + (1− μ)
∫ ω¯
0
ωf(ω)dω
2
Also be shown later on:
B(ω¯) =
ω¯
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯) + σ
2
ω
2√
2σω
)
+ (1− μ)1
2
[
1 + erf
(
ln(ω¯)− σ2ω
2√
2σω
)]
where erf(z) = 2√
π
∫ z
0
e−t
2
dt is the “error function”.
We define φt as the fraction of the return from importing that is wasted
in monitoring:
φt = μ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωf(ω)dω
The case when ωit is log-normally distributed with E(lnω) = −σ
2
ω
2
and
V ar(lnω) = σ2ω is described in detail below.
The importer’s consumption:
PCmt = (1− ν)RMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1MtA(ω¯t) (1.12)
and the aggregate net-worth is:
NWt+1 = ν(1− φt)RMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1Mt − ν(1 + i∗t )
St
St−1
(St−1P ∗Mt−1Mt −NWt)
Finally, the nominal return rate from importing:
RMtSt−1P ∗Mt−1 = Zt (1.13)
1.4 Monetary Policy Rules
1 + it+1 =
(
Pt
Pt−1
1
π¯
)μπ (St
S¯
)μS
(1 + i¯) (1.14)
1.5 Equilibrium
Final goods market must clearing conditions:
Yt = Ct + C
M
t +
ψD
2
(Dt+1 − D¯)2 + ψP
2
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1)2 + ZtMt
Pt
φt (1.15)
3
The aggregate balance of payments condition:
StP
∗
MtMt+1 + St(1 + it
∗)[Dt + DMt] = StP ∗XtX + St[Dt+1 + DMt+1] (1.16)
The equilibrium is a collection of 18 sequences of allocation:
(Wt, Lt, Pt, it, Ct, C
M
t , Dt+1, DMt+1, St,Mt, Yt,MCt, RMt, ω¯t, Zt, NWt+1, Vt, Xt)
satisfying the equilibrium conditions 1.1-1.18. I use perturbation method
from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe to solve this system of equations.
2 Derivation of the external finance premium
In this section, I derive the external finance premium used in the text. I
closely follow the model of BGG and DLX.
At the end of period t a continuum of importers indexed by j need to
finance the import of StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1 that will be re-sold to domestic producers
in period t + 1. Importers are subject to idiosyncratic shocks so that if one
unit of funds in terms of domestic currency is invested by importer j, then
the return is given by ωjRMt+1, where RMt+1 is the gross return of importer,
and ωj follows a log-normal distribution with with mean −σ2ω
2
and variance
σ2ω and is distributed i.i.d. across importers and time.
The realization of ωj can be observed by importers but not by lenders.
Lenders, however, can discover the true realization at a cost φ times the total
return from importing. Since both lenders and importers are risk neutral,
standard results establish that the optimal contract between an importer
and a lender is a debt contract, where the importer pays a fixed amount
ω¯jRMt+1StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1 to the lender if ω
j > ω¯j. If ωj < ω¯j, the lender proceed
to monitor the project, the importer gets nothing, and the lender receives
the full amount of import net of monitoring costs. Therefore, the expected
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return to the importer can be expressed as:
RMt+1StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1
[∫ ∞
ω¯jt+1
ωjf(ω)dω − ω¯jt+1
∫ ∞
ω¯jt+1
f(ω)dω
]
≡ RMt+1StP ∗MtM jt+1A(ω¯jt+1) (2.17)
The expected return to the lender is then given by:
RMt+1StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1
[
ω¯jt+1
∫ ∞
ω¯jt+1
f(ω)dω + (1− μ)
∫ ω¯jt
0
ωjt+1f(ω)dω
]
≡ RMt+1StP ∗MtM jt+1B(ω¯jt+1) (2.18)
The lender should receive a return at least equal to the world opportunity
cost, given by R∗t+1 = 1+ i
∗
t+1. Therefore, the participation constraint of the
lender in terms of the foreign currency can be written as:
RMt+1StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1B(ω¯
j
t+1)
St+1
=
R∗t+1(RMt+1StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1 −NW jt+1)
St
(2.19)
An optimal contract chooses the threshold value ω¯it+1 and M
j
t+1 to solve
the following problem:
maxEt
(
RMt+1StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1A(
¯ωiNt+1)
)
(2.20)
subject to the participation constraint (2.19).
The two first order condition implied by the contract is then:
Et
[
RMt+1StP
∗
MtA(ω¯
j
t+1)
]
+Et
[
λt+1
RMt+1StP
∗
MtB(ω¯
j
t+1)
St+1
− λt+1R
∗
t+1StP
∗
Mt
St
]
= 0
(2.21)
λt+1(θ) =
π(θ)A′(ω¯jt+1(θ))St+1(θ)
B′( ¯ωit+1(θ))
(2.22)
where θ ∈ Θ is a state of the world, π(θ) is the probability of state θ and
λt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint.
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Substitute 2.22 into 2.21, we get:
Et
(
RMt+1
[
A′( ¯ωjt+1)
B′( ¯ωjt+1)
B( ¯ωjt+1)− A( ¯ωjt+1)
])
= Et
[
A′( ¯ωjt+1)
B′( ¯ωjt+1)
St+1
St
R∗t+1
]
(2.23)
Since ωj is i.i.d across entrepreneurs, every importer actually faces the
same financial contract, so we could drop the superscript j. Rearranging 2.23
to get (1.10) in the text.
The importers are assumed to die at any time period with probability
(1− ν). Thus, at any given period, a fraction (1− ν) of importers’ net-worth
is consumed. So the consumption of importers is given by 1.12. And the net
worth NWt+1 is given by:
NWt+1 = νRMt+1StP
∗
MtM
j
t+1A(ω¯t) (2.24)
Use the fact that B(ω¯) = 1 − A(ω¯) − μ ∫ ω¯
0
ωf(ω)dω and imposing the par-
ticipation constraint, we get ??.
3 Derivation of A(·), A′(·), B(·) and B′(·)
This derivation follows closely that on the Appendix of DLX’s paper. By
definitions:
A(ω¯) =
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωf(ω)dω− ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω (3.25)
B(ω¯) = ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω + (1− μ)
∫ ω¯
0
ωf(ω)dω (3.26)
Since ωit is log-normally distributed with mean −σ
2
ω
2
and variance σ2ω, we
know that
E(ω) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ωf(ω)dω = 1 (3.27)
where the density function f(ω) is given by:
f(ω) =
1
σωω
√
2π
exp
{
−(lnω +
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
}
(3.28)
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Therefore,∫ ∞
ω¯
ωf(ω)dω =
∫ ∞
ln ω¯
1
σω
√
2π
exp
{
−(y +
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
}
exp(y)dy
=
∫ ∞
ln ω¯
1
σω
√
2π
exp
{
−(y −
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
}
dy
=
1√
π
∫ ∞
ln ω¯
exp
{
−(y −
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
}
d(
y − σ2ω
2√
2σω
)
=
1
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯)− σ2ω
2√
2σω
)
(3.29)
where erfc(z) = 2√
π
∫∞
z
e−t
2
dt is the complementary error function.
Similarly,
ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω = ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
1
σωω
√
2π
exp
{
−(lnω +
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
}
dω
= ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
1
σω
√
2π
exp
{
−(lnω +
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
}
d lnω
= ω¯
∫ ∞
ln ω¯
1√
π
exp
{
−(lnω +
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
}
d(
lnω + σ
2
ω
2√
2σω
)
=
ω¯
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯) + σ
2
ω
2√
2σω
)
(3.30)
As results:
A(ω¯) =
1
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯)− σ2ω
2√
2σω
)
− ω¯
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯) + σ
2
ω
2√
2σω
)
(3.31)
At the same time,∫ ω¯
0
ωf(ω)dω =
1√
π
∫ ln ω¯
−∞
exp
{
−(y −
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
}
d(
y − σ2ω
2√
2σω
)
=
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
ln(ω¯)− σ2ω
2√
2σω
)]
(3.32)
7
B(ω¯) =
ω¯
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯) + σ
2
ω
2√
2σω
)
+ (1− μ)1
2
[
1 + erf
(
ln(ω¯)− σ2ω
2√
2σω
)]
(3.33)
where erf(z) = 2√
π
∫ z
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function.
Next, since:
A′(ω¯) = − 1√
2πσω
[
1
ω¯
exp
(
−(ln(ω¯)−
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
)
− exp
(
−(ln(ω¯) +
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
)]
− 1
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯) + σ
2
ω
2√
2σω
)
(3.34)
However,
1
ω¯
exp
(
−(ln(ω¯)−
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
)
= exp[− ln(ω¯)] exp
(
−(ln(ω¯)−
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
)
= exp
(
−(ln(ω¯) +
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
)
(3.35)
Therefore,
A′(ω¯) = −1
2
erfc
(
ln(ω¯) + σ
2
ω
2√
2σω
)
(3.36)
Note that E(ω) = 1, so B(ω¯) = 1− A(ω¯)− μ ∫ ω¯
0
ωf(ω)dω, thus
B′(ω¯) = −A′(ω¯)− μ√
2πσω
exp
(
−(ln(ω¯) +
σ2ω
2
)2
2σ2ω
)
(3.37)
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